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FOREWORD
In the week beginning June 5, 1967, the world was startled by a lightning war which threw the Middle East into a turmoil—^the Six-Day War. Six vital days which saw the birth of a new Middle East, altered the map of this part of the world, alarmed the Great Powers, humbled the Soviet Union and demonstrated the power of Israel.
In the aftermath of this astounding victory, few thought about the crucial weeks which Israel lived through immediately preceding the war. Incited by Syrian extremists, Nasser was determined to show that he was the supreme leader of the Arab world. Obsessed by memories of the defeats inflicted upon him by Israel in 1948 and 1956, he launched into an unreasonable undertaking. It seemed an opportune time to wipe Israel from the map. Events succeeded each other with frightening speed—troop movements towards Sinai involving a 100,000 men, thousands of vehicles, hundreds of tanks and planes; the closing of the Straits of Tiran to IsraeU shipping; the signing of military pacts with Jordan and Iraq . . .
Israel was taken by surprise, and for help and support turned to the Great Powers and the international organizations—^but to no avail. Yet David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister of the State of Israel, had stated repeatedly over the years his beUef that the country could rely only on her own strength. International guarantees, the promises of heads of state and the resolutions of the United Nations would never insure the security and the survival of Israel. The State had to be master of its fate.
On June 1, 1967, General Moshe Dayan, disciple and confidant of Ben-Gurion, was appointed Minister of Defense. He shared Ben-Gurion's views on the manner in which Israel should meet any threat to her existence. He was appointed to this key post despite the fact that he belonged to a small opposition party, RAFI. Popular feeling forced the Government to entrust him with the
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