The Short March [antikvár]

Introduction what happened in Czechoslovalcia during February 1948 represents a crucial episode in modern European history: with the coming to power of the Communists there, the Moscow-dominated bloc of Central European states which exists today was complete. For the country in which these events took place and for its then population of 12 million — the Czechs and Slovaks and the Hungarian, German, Polish and Ukrainian national minorities — February 1948 was a tragic crossroads both for the state and for the country's development. Thereafter a system of organization and control of political, economic, cultural and civil life was grafted on to Czechoslovak society, a system which ran counter to the country's traditions, interests, needs and will. As time went on, an increasing number of Czechoslovaks, even those who were among the "victors of February", became aware of the negative consequences of this turning-point. February 1948 was the Czechoslovak version of a Communist seizure of power and link-up with the Soviet bloc. The same or similar transformations took place in all European states within the Soviet sphere of influence. The peculiarity of the Czechoslovak experience was that in February 1948 the Communists achieved their intentions with the consent and support of a large part of the population. They did so by means of promises and political declarations which they never fulfilled and had never meant to fulfil. Why were they able to triumph so easily and with such strong support? One could argue that the roots of their victory stretched back to Hitler''s march into Central Europe in the late 1930s, which led to Britain and France relinquishing their positions in the region. Subsequently, Hitler's defeat in the Second World War left this part of Europe open to domination by the Soviet Union. In reality this is only part of the answer. The Soviet presence in Central Europe predetermined the final outcome — the taking of power by the Communist monopoly. The course that the conflict took, the forms of resistance and the efforts of the non-Communist forces to countermand the power designs of the Communists were all an' 'internal affair'' dependent on the strength of the Communists and their ability and readiness to wage such a fight. If, from an international viewpoint, the Communists' opponents had had no hope of victory, all the greater was the significance of domestic political factors